INDIA’S first Field Marshal, Sam Bahadur Manekshaw, who succumbed to pneumonia on June 26, two months after his 94th birthday, will remain a legendary figure in the annals of Indian military history. He was given a befitting farewell by millions of Indians – though the Indian state was parsimonious in its presence – when he was laid to rest in the Nilgiri Hills where he spent the latter part of his glorious life.
Manekshaw was born in Amritsar in 1914, and his army career began in 1932 when he joined the first batch of the Indian Gentlemen Cadets at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. Commissioned in the Frontier Force in 1934, he saw action in the Second World War where he displayed exemplary courage in battle in the Burma (Myanmar) theatre. He was awarded a Military Cross (MC) by a British general who thought that the young Manekshaw would not survive the bullet wounds he had sustained. The MC cannot be awarded posthumously, so Major General D.T. Cowan pinned his own medal on the gallant Indian Captain. But fortune favoured the brave Manekshaw.
An Australian surgeon who was tending to the wounded was debating whether Manekshaw could be saved. What convinced the doctor in favour of operating on the seriously wounded Manekshaw was the latter’s puckish sense of humour even as he lay dying. When asked what had happened to him, Manekshaw said: “A mule kicked me.”
Post-Partition, in August 1947, Manekshaw as a Parsi had the option to join either the Indian Army or move to the newly created Pakistan Army. He chose India and was transferred to the Gorkha Rifles where he earned the sobriquet “Bahadur”. Closely associated with the consolidation of the Indian state under the firm hand of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whose confidence he enjoyed, Manekshaw was a key planner in the October 1947 Kashmir operations where the Indian Army was called out.
In the years that followed, Manekshaw was witness to the Nehruvian idealism that sought to shrink the size and relevance of the Indian military. However, he gradually acquired a reputation for being a totally apolitical yet professional soldier who could not be pushed around by the civilian establishment. The emerging politico-bureaucratic dispensation under a towering Prime Minister like Jawaharlal Nehru weakened India’s military sinews through an insidious mix of ignorance of matters military and strategic and outright disdain for sound professionalism that went against the Nehruvian diktat.
Manekshaw’s professional life reflected this pernicious culture. Nehru’s Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon tried to belittle the higher ranks of the Indian Army. The result was that truly professional and apolitical soldiers such as Gen. K.S. Thimayya and Gen. Manekshaw were treated shabbily and their advice spurned. The country paid a heavy price for this – the 1962 war with China was testimony to this crass political ineptitude. Such was the bitter vendetta carried out by Krishna Menon that he initiated a court of inquiry against Manekshaw for “anti-national” activities in early 1962 on totally false charges and sought – unsuccessfully – to penalise him.
However, the debacle of 1962 forced Nehru to acknowledge the folly of this political interference in internal military affairs and he belatedly resurrected officers like Manekshaw. Ironically, Manekshaw was sent to take over from Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul – a Krishna Menon favourite – 4 Corps in the Eastern Sector, which had been mauled by the Chinese Army. This is where he issued the first of his many flamboyant one-liners: “There will be no more withdrawals.”
Luck, as always, was on his side and the Chinese announced a cessation of hostilities and withdrew. He became the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Army and then of the Eastern Army in Calcutta (Kolkata), and was elevated to the post of Army chief in 1969. Sam Bahadur, by dint of personal example and sound professionalism, rebuilt the Indian Army.
The clouds of war with Pakistan were looming in early 1971 over the repression and genocide in East Pakistan. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wanted the Indian Army to enter the fray so that a popularly elected government could be installed in Dhaka. However, Manekshaw refused to be pushed into hasty action and he gave the Prime Minister very objective advice – much to her surprise. Years later, he recalled how angry Indira Gandhi was at his dissenting view initially. But she respected his professional appreciation and concurred with his planning and execution of the 1971 war.
In keeping with his strong commitment to the democratic ethos and the provisions of the Indian Constitution, Manekshaw, who had the highest respect for civilian political supremacy over the military, offered to resign voluntarily in the event the Prime Minister did not approve of his dissent. To Indira Gandhi’s credit, she took Manekshaw’s advice, reposed confidence in him and entrusted him with full responsibility of the actual conduct of the war with no political interference.
The 1971 war with Pakistan was an outstanding military success. India managed to do what no country had done since the Second World War – achieve a decisive military victory over an adversary and dismember that country. Regrettably, there was inadequate appreciation of the politico-military harmonisation of “victory”, and Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto seemed to emerge the political equal of Indira Gandhi at Shimla despite the military defeat. Few people in the Indian political and higher bureaucracy seemed to know about war termination objectives and how a military victory could be translated into an abiding political advantage.
In retrospect, it would appear that the Indian military was neither encouraged nor allowed to contribute to higher politico-military strategic planning and thereby the nation was not able to maximise the victory over the Pakistan Army.
Thus we have a paradox in that, while the Pakistan Army had subsumed the state and became the central actor in the hostile relationship with India, the Indian military was kept outside the national decision-making framework. To compound the damage, the ruling politico-bureaucratic culture sustained this distancing and denigration of the Indian fauj (soldier). Manekshaw became the symbol of both public adulation and private anxiety – both in his life and death.
Soon after the December 1971 victory and the birth of Bangladesh, Indira became India – a veritable Durga who had slain the wicked demon, an accolade that Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then a young Opposition parliamentarian, generously paid his political opponent. India and Indira, who were both going through a period of post-1962/post-Nehru despondency and lack of esteem, found their confidence after this victory.
This achievement of the nation and its Prime Minister was enabled to a great extent by Manekshaw and his service peers – and nobody realised this more keenly than Indira Gandhi. In Pakistan, the people were baying for the blood of their disgraced generals, while in India, their counterparts, Sam Manekshaw and Jagjit Singh Arora (the commander of the Indian forces in the east), were being publicly feted.
In 1973, Manekshaw was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal and his public profile was unparalleled for any Indian fauji. Then occurred one of those historic accidents – triggered by Manekshaw’s spontaneous sense of humour and repartee. Responding to a question about what would have happened if he, as a Parsee, had opted to join the Pakistan Army in August 1947, he joked that maybe Pakistan would have won the 1971 war. That was to be a costly quip and the Field Marshal was publicly upbraided by many who were envious of his growing stature.
The Indian state had found its opportunity to cut the soldier to size and cast him in a poor light. Manekshaw stepped down as Army chief in early 1973 and retired gracefully from the limelight – which he no doubt revelled in but had never actively sought.
An anecdote is illustrative. Post-retirement, Sam Bahadur went to Indore where the local citizens organised a public reception. The Field Marshal was mobbed by crowds shouting “Manekshaw ki jai”, and he reached the podium with difficulty.
The keynote speaker made an adulatory speech in Hindi, which went on thus: “We have in our midst today a soldier whose very name is synonymous with valour. He makes us remember Rana Pratap, Jhansi ki Rani and the gallant Shivaji, whose deeds form our national heritage. When we hear him speak, blood courses through our veins with great speed….”
Manekshaw also made his speech in Hindi, quipping: “I have only one request. Could I have an English translation of the speech I just heard? I want to give it to my wife. Whenever I tell her that I am a big man, a great man, she does not even listen. Perhaps after reading this, she will believe me!” Predictably, he brought the house down, and the ovation continued. Later, he was to joke that life had ordained that he obey two women all his life – his wife at home and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at work.Flamboyant professional
Manekshaw was a flamboyant soldier who combined the best of the British tradition that he was groomed in and the distinctively Indian ethos that he was born into. Many tales abound about his special relationship with Indira Gandhi, including the “I am always ready, sweetie” response. To her credit, Indira Gandhi enjoyed this gentle sparring with an Army general who could tell her with a naughty twinkle in his eye, without transgressing certain lines of politico-military propriety, that she looked beautiful.
Manekshaw was neither a George Patton or an Erwin Rommel in the classical sense of the battlefield general, nor a theorist like Alfred Mahan. But he was a rigorous professional soldier and an outstanding manager of higher defence planning and prosecution. The politico-military-bureaucratic synergy he arrived at as Army chief with Indira Gandhi, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Defence Secretary K.B. Lall during the 1971 operations remains distinctive and unparalleled.
As K। Subrahmanyam, the doyen of the strategic planning community, notes: “… the lesson from the Bangladesh campaign had not been drawn and absorbed by the Indian politicians. The lesson was the Prime Minister and the Cabinet should be in constant touch with external intelligence and should have a continuous rapport with the leadership of the armed forces. Our politicians and senior civil bureaucracy have woefully failed to learn this lesson to this day.”

Regrettably, Manekshaw never wrote an authoritative personal biography recounting this experience. I recall a conversation I had with him in 1986 when Gen. Cariappa was elevated as Field Marshal.
Like many of my generation, I was in awe of Manekshaw and ventured to ask him about the 1971 War. His reply was characteristically modest and he gave greater credit to the civilian leadership that was at the helm and encouraged me to highlight the role of the late K.B. Lall, “that extraordinary but forgotten ICS officer”.
Sad to say, post-1971, the Indian governing ethos progressively relegated the Indian military to the background. Ironically, in his death, Sam Bahadur, for all his monumental contribution to the making of India, was treated in a rather graceless manner by the Indian state. But this lack of magnanimity taints the state structure more than the glory of Sam Bahadur, which will remain shining and inviolable for a grateful nation.
The fact that despite being accorded a state funeral, no senior member of the Cabinet was present when his body was laid to rest, leave alone the President as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces or the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister, will remain a taint on the record of the United Progressive Alliance government. Minister of State for Defence Pallam Raju was the sole senior political representative.
Ironically, the three Service chiefs were not present either. To add insult to injury, in keeping with the rule-bound mendacity of the Indian state, it was pointed out that since the rank of a Field Marshal was not (yet) included in the Government of India’s warrant of precedence, the great Indian state edifice was unable to respond.
It mattered little that Manekshaw had been elevated as Field Marshal – a five-star rank in 1973 – and that Field Marshals never retire. But for some inexplicable reason, for 35 years the appropriate rules and regulations were not formulated. The government departments concerned and Army headquarters have besmirched themselves indelibly in the public eye and many Indians have pointed out in letters to editors of newspapers and in cyberspace that our highest political representatives found the time and motivation to attend the funerals of less illustrious fellow Indians.
But if Manekshaw was treated shabbily by the political spectrum, he was always held in high esteem and remembered with enormous affection by the Indian fauj. News of his death led to a spontaneous outpouring of tributes and accolades both from within the country and from neighbouring Bangladesh, a nation that he helped create. Perhaps the manner of his final march into history symbolises what he represented to India and its people.
Amends were made with a condolence book being placed at India Gate in New Delhi for the Delhi hierarchy and public to pay their tributes to the Field Marshal. Rarely has there been such a turnout.
Manekshaw’s greatest and most abiding contribution was the manner in which he restored the muddied pride of the Indian soldier after the ignominy of the 1962 war with China.
Maybe Manekshaw’s handicap was that he was too much of a “bahadur” while the military as an institution remained marginal to the Indian political scheme of things।
This visibly disdainful attitude to the Indian soldier was nurtured by Nehru as Prime Minister and bolstered by the civilian bureaucracy of his time, which always spoke in whispers about the danger of a military coup – as had happened in Pakistan and Myanmar – in the event the higher military leadership was given its due and brought into the loop of higher governance and security planning.
More than 60 years after Independence, the political dispensation in India is yet to maximise the many potentialities that a truly apolitical and professional military can bring to the national quiver. Sam Manekshaw remains the exception. Field Marshals never retire but only die, but this legendary figure will not die in public memory.
The image of an upright and highly professional soldier with that jaunty Gorkha cap and a twinkle in his eye, who did his nation proud, will abide.•

The real victim

GENDER ISSUESThe real victim
T.K. RAJALAKSHMI
Campaigns to amend Section 498A of the IPC citing misuse of the anti-dowry law are being strengthened in many parts of the country.
V. SUDERSHAN MEMBERS OF THE Save Indian Family Foundation staging a protest against Section 498A of the IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, in New Delhi in August last year.
ON June 25, a round table organised by the Ministry for Women and Child Development and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on building partnerships with men towards women’s empowerment and gender equality had an ironic interruption from a group of men claiming to be victims of Section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which relates to dowry harassment. Demanding that they be heard by Union Minister Renuka Chowdhury, they shouted slogans within the premises of the India Islamic Centre where the conference was being held.
The protesters, wearing black badges, represented organisations such as the Save Family Foundation, the Delhi Pariwarik Suraksha Samiti, the Lucknow-based Pati Pariwar Kalyan Samiti and the Kolkata-based Bharat Bachao Sangathan. They demanded that the existing law be redrafted since, according to them, their families, including women, had been arrested by the police on false charges of taking dowry – all under the garb of implementing Section 498A. Under this section, the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty was liable to be punished with imprisonment up to three years and a fine.
The Minister, who was livid at first with the representatives for attempting to disrupt the meeting and for making derogatory remarks about women in government positions, later gave them a hearing; she, however, declined to interfere with the law as it existed, arguing that the law did not discriminate, nor was it designed to be misused.
This is not the first time that a clamour has been kicked up over Section 498 A. And the protests are not confined to Delhi. They have become more strident in the recent past with several organisations, having websites of their own, actively campaigning against the law. One such website is www.498a.org dedicated to the fight against the dowry law. The Save Indian Family Foundation also makes similar campaigns against the law
( http://www.saveindianfamily.org/).
From the experience of women’s organisations, the few cases of misuse that may have occurred are an exception rather than the rule. Women’s organisations that have been dealing with violence over the years believe that had the law been actually put to good use, there would be fewer instances of harassment of and violence against women over dowry and fewer dowry deaths. They feel the unabated violence in the name of dowry continues because dowry prohibition laws have not been very effective. It was surprising that the Minister even agreed to meet representatives of anti-dowry law organisations, especially as statistics, national as well as State-wise, show an escalation in the demand for dowry and in dowry-related violence and deaths. Crime records from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and the National Commission for Women (NCW) and several research studies on domestic violence show that, if anything, cruelty towards women in India on account of dowry demands has gone up in the past two decades. It is a well-known fact that the increasing desire for a male child and the rejection of the girl child in the womb itself and the consequent female foeticide, which has contributed to the adverse child sex ratio in the country, have a lot to do with the burgeoning demand for dowry. The provocation
However, the immediate factor that fuelled the demand from these outfits is an order passed by Y.S. Dadwal, the Chief Police Commissioner of Delhi. On June 22, Dadwal issued a circular stating that no arrests would be made in cases of alleged dowry harassment without prior investigation, in order to prevent misuse of the anti-dowry law. No arrests, he said, would be made under Section 498A (matrimonial cruelty) without the prior written approval of the area Deputy Commissioner of Police. As per the circular, only the main accused would be arrested, instead of the previous practice of booking all the relatives of the accused. The circular stated: “Arrest of the accused should be an exception, not a rule. From the allegations set out in the FIR and other subsequent allegations or material collected during investigation, if necessary, only the prime/main accused whose primary role in the commission of the offence has been established should be arrested and that too after the prior written approval of the DCP.”
The list of complaints received by the Delhi Police in 2007 had around 4,400 distress calls made to various police stations, of which 25 per cent pertained to domestic violence and about 17.42 per cent related to rape and sexual assault. The circular also coincided with the results of a survey conducted by a research organisation, which showed that 6 per cent of the complaints in cases of dowry harassment were aimed at settling scores and getting even with the in-laws. This meant that 94 per cent of the cases were genuine.
The police chief’s circular is based on a May 2003 judgment of the Delhi High Court on Sections 498A and 406 of the IPC, which suggested that offences under the two sections be made bailable and compoundable. The judgment said that misuse of these sections was hitting at the foundation of marriage itself and had not proved “so good for the health of society at large”. The same year, the Delhi Commission for Women reported that 80 per cent of all the complaints it handled pertained to dowry demands and harassment. The All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), which has condemned Dadwal’s order, had protested even then stating that to suggest that these offences be made bailable was to undermine the violence suffered by Indian women daily.
AIDWA has pointed out that while other sections of the IPC were misused, none had wanted them altered. In 2003, AIDWA had written to the then Chief Justice of India, Justice V.N. Khare, that a survey of judgments under Section 498A showed that most High Courts had only punished the grossest forms of violence and cruelty and that Section 498A had been interpreted in an extremely narrow manner in most judicial pronouncements. The organisation stated that it was not Sections 498A or 405 that hit the foundation of marriage but the violence and inequality faced by women. “We appeal to you not only to find ways and means to gender sensitise the judiciary but also to ensure that an important criterion in the selection of judges be their commitment to the cause of women,” AIDWA had written then.
Talking to Frontline, the Delhi police spokesperson said that the circular was based on several court orders. In fact, similar pronouncements on the misuse of Section 498A had been made by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Bombay High Court. In 1990, the latter court, in an order, held that “it is not every harassment or every type of cruelty that would attract Section 498A IPC – beating and harassment must be to force the bride to commit suicide or to fulfil illegal demands.” In 2002, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that harassment itself was not cruelty unless there was a demand for dowry for conviction under Section 498A.
Sudha Sundararaman, general secretary of AIDWA, said that if at all there was misuse of the law, the police had to be blamed for it and not the law itself. “All statistics point out that instances of dowry violence is going up. There is a definite backlash as more and more women are coming out and complaining about their situations. On the other hand, there are people who feel that violence is quite acceptable. Sometimes, they also have links with the police and the system. Their voices, rather than of those beaten up and killed on a regular basis, are heard,” she said. She mentioned a very recent instance in the national capital where a woman was murdered for not being able to procure Rs.20 lakh so that her husband could run his business. “She did not file a case of dowry harassment and ended up dead like so many other women, who go to the police as a last resort,” she said.
K.K. NAJEEB A scene from a street play organised in Thrissur in March by the Kerala Women’s Commission to protest against the dowry system.
Sahba Farooqi, general secretary of AIDWA’s Delhi unit, said that each DCP wanted fewer cases in his area of jurisdiction. Hence, she said, getting a complaint registered under 498A was a monumental task . “Every week, we get four or five dowry harassment cases. The women come to us after being turned away by the police,” she said, quoting a recent case where a Delhi resident had been told by the city police to file her complaint in Gurgaon, Haryana, because her matrimonial home was there. She said that the efforts of the Crime Against Women Cells were more towards reconciliation rather than in taking any serious cognisance of the complaints made. Often the women are persuaded to drop their complaints.
Between 2004 and 2007, complaints of dowry harassment constituted the bulk of the complaints received by the NCW. A substantial increase in dowry harassment cases was observed in each passing year; a fairly large number of the cases reported police apathy.
The NCRB in its crime data for the year 2006 recorded an almost 12 per cent increase in cases of dowry death (Sections 302/304B, IPC), 8.2 per cent increase in torture incidents (Section 498A) and a 40.6 per cent increase in cases registered under the Dowry Prohibition Act in 2006 over 2005. These figures do not in any way show that there has been a decline in cases of dowry harassment.
It was after a long and protracted struggle by women’s organisations that the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, was amended and new sections on cruelty and dowry-related murder were inserted in the IPC in 1983. The definition of cruelty was widened to include not only harassment relating to dowry but also other kinds of domestic violence. With the passage of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, women’s organisations have seen more and more women come out of the closet to register complaints of violence and abuse.
The campaigns against the misuse of the law has to have some substantive basis, but at least for now, there does not seem to be any. •

The New Delhi Scene

The New Delhi SceneThe drama has currently shifted to New Delhi. Acontroversy obtains over how the provisions of theamended American law are prejudicing India’snational interests. Since India will gain access tonuclear technology and legitimacy for its nuclearweapon status without joining the NonproliferationTreaty or accepting fullscope safeguards, why isNew Delhi looking the gift horse in the mouth?Why is a strange coalition of the Left and Rightparties in India opposing the US legislation, apartfrom a group of former AEC officials? Each ofthese entities has its own agenda. Briefly, the Leftparties are driven by ideological compulsions tooppose any steps by India to improve its relationswith the UnitedStates. Nocontradiction isseen betweensuch negativismand wooingAmericanbusiness to theCommunist-ruledstate of WestBengal. Similarly,the BJP, now inOpposition, findsno contradiction in opposing the nuclear deal,despite having initiated steps to deepen bilateralIndo-US relations when they were in power during1998-2004. They are now animated by the desireto oppose everything the Congress-led UPAgovernment does. The former AEC officials are informed by an exaggerated ultra-nationalism,which really conceals their animus against theUnited States for having treated them as pariahsafter the Pokharan I nuclear test in 1974.Importantly, are they providing an alibi for the UPAGovernment’s own predilections? This doubt arisesbecause it could easily ignore the Left parties andthe BJP. Neither is really prepared to bring downthe UPA Government and face new elections.The objections voiced in New Delhi to goingbeyond the literal provisions of the 18 July 2005nuclear deal and the 2 March 2006 separationplan have been voiced by many parties, andspecifically by the Prime Minister in Parliament on17 August 2006, Sonia Gandhi outside Parliamentand, most recently, by the Foreign Minister inParliament on 12 December, 2006. They do notseem to appreciate the tortuous legislative historyof the amended American law. Indeed, theForeign Minister noted “certain extraneous andprescriptive provisions in the legislation,” beforethrowing the gauntlet that India’s objective “isthat technology denial regimes that havetargeted India for so many decades must bedismantled.” But the qualifications in this legislationembody the compromises made by Americanlawmakers to finalize a very divisive amendinglaw, balancing the political interests of the Bushadministration, business interests of the nuclearindustry, and the ideological interests of the nonproliferationlobby. This is the divisive backdrop tothe 123 negotiations between India and theUnited States, impinging on the parallelnegotiations proceeding with the IAEA to finalize asafeguards agreement to govern India’s nuclearprogram, and India’s efforts to secure supportfrom individual member-countries to exempt Indiafrom the provisions of the NSG Guidelines.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal - from Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

The Indo-US nuclear deal enjoys considerablesupport in the US policy community—WhiteHouse, Congress, State Department, and Neo-Con think tanks close to the Bush administration,(apart from the nuclear industry). They hope thatthe greatly improved relations with India would,hopefully, counter-balance the envelopingdisaster in Iraq. The present status of the Indo-USnuclear deal is that the US Atomic Energy Act of1954 has been amended to exempt India from itsprovisions; thus allowing the transfer of nucleartechnology to India despite its being outside theNonproliferation Treaty and not acceptingfullscope safeguards over its nuclear program.Now, the so-called 123 agreement must benegotiated by the two countries in line with thisenabling legislation.Core IssuesFour basic issues provide an overview to thepresent debate on the nuclear deal.First, have both countries over-invested in it? Thisviewpoint reflects the voice of caution. The moreintrepid would urge that negotiating a radicalIndo-US nuclear deal would raise their relationshipto a qualitatively higher level. In truth, both thesepositions are extreme. India needs to deepen itsrelations with the US, which occupies the apex ofpolitical, military, economic and technologicalpower in the international system. The US needs toincorporate a democratic, multiethnic and risingIndia into its strategic fold to shape the evolvinginternational system. It is arguable therefore thatIndo-US relations will weather the fate of thenuclear deal, whichever direction it takes.

Second, what are the compulsions informing bothcountries to negotiate this deal? India requiresnuclear technology from abroad—specificallynatural uranium for its heavy water reactors, lowenriched uranium for its light water reactors, andtechnical information to hasten its fast breederreactor program. But it will not join theNonproliferation Treaty or accept fullscopesafeguards. In lieu, the Bush Administration wishes toco-opt India into its strategic schema for containingthe growing challenge from China. In essence, theUnited States is sacrificing its commitment to thenonproliferation regime at the altar of regionaldiplomacy. This suits New Delhi. Besides gainingrecognition for its nuclear weapon status, it canacquire nuclear technology and internationalfinance to expand its atomic energy program,while ceasing to be excluded by technologycontrol regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG).Third, the intense debate in India on this deal hasbeen frugal on assessing the place of atomicenergy in India’s energy future. Only 3000 MWs, lessthan 3 % of its total power, is presently beinggenerated by the Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), despite some 50 years of strenuous effort.The Sarabhai profile (1970) had envisaged the AECproducing 10,000 MWs by 1980. Now, it is promisedthat 30,000 MWs would be generated by 2022 and63,000 MWs by 2032. How realistic are these targets,if the AEC’s past record is reviewed? No details areavailable on where the finances for this giganticprogram would be found or how the accentuatedproblems of reactor safety or waste disposal wouldbe addressed. Apropos, wind power productionover the last decade has crossed 4000 MWs. Awilling suspension of disbelief is needed to acceptthe AEC’s grandiose schemes.PR ChariResearch Professor, IPCS Fourth, the centrality of the AEC in India’s nucleardecision-making processes has greatlyaccelerated after the Indo-US nuclear deal wasreached on July 18, 2005. The frequency of theAEC Chairman’s public statements, often contraryto the positions taken by the Ministry of ExternalAffairs, bears testimony to this phenomenon. TheAEC’s new centrality in the nuclear decisionmakingprocess is also manifested by the PrimeMinister conceding that any final agreementreached with the United States would bereviewed by a group of AEC retirees, which is amodality unknown before in the annals of theIndian administration. The AEC’s power derivesprimarily from its proximity to the Prime Minister, itssecretive ways of working, and its now becomingthe repository of India’s magic nuclear deterrent.